Ever since a defector exposed the existence of Iran's nuclear program in 2002, the regime in Tehran has routinely protested its innocence in the face of charges that it is developing fissile weapons of mass destruction and the missiles on which to carry them. Its nuclear program, Tehran claims, has only civilian purposes, and it is allowed to pursue such a program under the terms of the binding international treaties to which it is a signatory...

The United States has backed off its military threats to stop Iran’s nuclear program. The “stick” has thus been removed from the “carrot and stick” option. What can Europe do now to frustrate the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions? To start with, as Iran’s main trade partner, the EU can endorse broader, shrewder, and harsher sanctions.

Alla demokratier står i dag inför en utmaning, en kraftfullt mobiliserande kraft med en agenda som står i bjärt kontrast mot de demokratiska värderingarna. Utmaningen är islamism, en ideologi somkräver människans fullständiga lydnad för islams heliga lag, avfärdar inflytande utifrån (med några undantag, som tillgång till militär och medicinsk teknologi) och genomsyras av en djup antagonism mot icke-muslimer och särskilt mot Väst.

Alla västerländska länder har stora och växande muslimska minoriteter, som i sin tur hyser en liten, men växande, publik för islamism. Nyligen visade en brittisk studie, till exempel, att 7 procent av de tillfrågade sade sig ”beundra organisationer som al-Qaida som är beredda att kämpa emot Väst”...

Il nuovo acuirsi del conflitto tra israeliani e palestinesi in questi ultimi anni è stato accompagnato, in Europa, dal risorgere di fenomeni di antisemitismo. Questo chiaro nesso non ha risparmiato l’Italia, nonostante la limitata presenza ebraica nel paese, la natura altamente integrata della comunità nel tessuto nazionale, e la sua permanenza ininterrotta nella penisola dai tempi della Roma repubblicana. Quanto emergerà da questo breve excursus è che nonostante vi siano ovvie differenze e peculiaritàdeterminate da fattori locali, l’Italia non si discosta dal trend generale europeo...

In the 2006 election, Israelis went to the polls to choose parties, rather than a prime minister, as they had done briefly in the 1990s under the direct election system. Direct election meant that on election-day voters would separately choose a candidate for prime minister, in addition to the usual party-list ballot cast for the Knesset. As two ballots meant more choice, this was commonly blamed for party fragmentation and for the increase in the power of small parties. A return to a single-ballot system was meant to reverse the unintended consequences of the direct election system. This article tests this hypothesis and assesses the legacy of Israel's brief experience with direct election in the 1990s.

If one looks at the ways in which the United States and Europe look at the Middle East and deal with it and one tries to explain transatlantic differences in outlook and policy, one can more or less say the following: in the US, the wide majority of people tend to be more pro-Israel and tend to blame the Arab side or the Palestinian side more; in Europe, the opposite tends to be true.

Nella confluenza tra demografia, immigrazione e identità sorge la sfida dell’Europa nel Ventunesimo secolo. La risposta si trova nel ritorno a un nazionalismo patriottico e civico, sufficientemente inclusivo da coinvolgere immigrati e minoranze linguistiche, etniche e religiose, ma non abbastanza da risultare privo di contenuti. Il perché demografia e immigrazione pongano difficili sfide dovrebbe essere ovvio. Da un lato ci sono una popolazione che invecchia, una tendenza tra le nuove generazioni a sposarsi tardi e fare pochi figli e uno stato sociale che una società sempre meno giovane fatica a finanziare. Con una crescita demografica negativa, l’Europa ha bisogno d’immigrati per sostenere il proprio sempre più affannato modello socio-economico.

The death of Palestinian Authority chairman Yasir Arafat together with Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon's commitment to withdraw from the Gaza Strip may have injected new momentum into Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, but European attitudes toward Israel continue to deteriorate. This antagonism has many causes—anti-Americanism, media antipathy toward the Jewish state, a perception that Israel is an outgrowth of colonialism, and anti-Semitism. An almost irrational hatred of Sharon, though, has catalyzed many of them, channeling anti-Zionism to new levels. The European obsession with Sharon increasingly makes its involvement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy more a hindrance than a help.

To help put matters into historical perspective, this articles focuses on a particular feature of the new European anti-Semitism that has been less commented on. This is the crucial role played by some European Jews themselves, mostly intellectuals or academics, who have responded to the latest assault on the Jewish people by excusing it, justifying it, and in effect joining it...

A united Europe is not far from becoming reality. A European identity that transcends the national identities of Europe’s member states, however, is still a distant dream. But Europe’s rapidly changing demographics cannot wait for this dream to come true. Identity is a crucial component of social cohesion, and the rapid influx of immigrants, mainly from the Muslim world, demands a choice: Should immigrants be encouraged to integrate into the national cultures and identities of the EU member states? Or should Europe instead pursue a multicultural model, in which patriotism is discouraged in favor of a society divided by different identities, values, and historical narratives, but united by abstract rights and duties under EU treatises and regulations? Is a third way available, a common European identity for all Europeans, old-timers and newcomers alike, that can transcend narrower communal loyalties to find a new common home? And if a third way were possible, what kind of European identity would it yield anyway, given the post-national utopian vision on which Europe is built?

Comprendere il conflitto israelo-palestinese attraverso l'analisi di tutte le possibili soluzioni, cioè capire la realtà utilizzando le previsioni di scenario: è la strategia analitica proposta dall'autore, una strategia che si rivela efficace per avere una visione più chiara e realistica dei motivi che fino ad oggi hanno impedito l'individuazione di una soluzione che tutti auspicano.

In recenti interviste e articoli, lo studioso americano Daniel Pipes ha sostenuto che ‘l’Islam radicale é il problema, l’Islam moderato la soluzione.’ Apparentemente simili posizioni sono state espresse da esponenti dell’Amministrazione Bush prima dell’operazione Iraqi Freedom. Paul Wolfowitz, ad esempio, ha dichiarato come la Turchia sia il modello da perseguire in Medio Oriente, mentre l’insistenza americana a creare un nuovo assetto regionale in Medio Oriente si fonda sulla convinzione che solo una riforma radicale interna delle societá—una riforma politica oltre che socio-economica—potrá indebolire la mistica del radicalismo islamico, la sua attrattiva e la sua capacitá di mobilitare e motivare crescenti numeri di giovani a unirsi alle sue file e a morire in nome degli ideali che promuove. Tale visione emerge nei molti discorsi pronunciati dal presidente George W. Bush sul Medio Oriente dopo l’11 settembre e appare alla base della visione americana sul Grande Medio Oriente, che gli USA sperano vedere adottata come iniziativa comune al vertice dei G8 a giugno del 2004. Tuttavia, le idee di Pipes e dell’Amministrazione Bush differiscono in merito alla strategia: la libertá si puó esportare o no? In altre parole, l’emergere di un Islam moderato puó o meno essere favorito dall’interventismo americano nella regione che ha seguito l’11 settembre?

Following the 1991 Gulf War, with the Madrid Peace Conference and te start of the Oslo process, the concept of a "New Middle East" came to express a new vision of economic integration, regional cooperation and globalisation.

Executive–legislative relations in Israel underwent important changes during the early 1990s, when Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, introduced a new system of direct election of the prime minister (PM).1 The introduction of the new system (to take place contextually with the renewal of the Knesset) solicited much debate and interest in academic as well as public circles, as its avowed purpose was to simultaneously enhance effective government and strengthen the Knesset. The reform, however, failed to achieve its goals. In 2001 the Knesset repealed it and restored the pre-1992 parliamentary system while introducing a watered down version of the constructive vote of no confidence and retaining some provisions from the short-lived reform.

Less than a decade ago, Israel became the world's first parliamentary democracy to adopt direct popular election as the method of choosing its prime minister. The passage of this controversial reform was spurred by a three-month-long government crisis in the spring of 1990, during which Israelis looked on in shock and dismay as members of their parliament (the 120-seat Knesset) indulged in an unprecedented public orgy of floor-crossing and unseemly bargaining, with parties and individual legislators scrambling for place, preferment, and political advantage. This episode--known ever after as "the stinking maneuver"--led Israelis to change their Basic Law in 1992 to require that a separate popular election of the prime minister (PM) be held concurrently with balloting for the Knesset, although the PM's mandate would continue to depend upon a parliamentary vote of confidence.