Speaking to France’s ambassadorial corps on August 27, 2007, newly elected French President, Nicholas Sarkozy, endorsed the current international approach to Iran’s nuclear programme, based on a mixture of incentives and disincentives. The two-pronged approach, Sarkozy said, “is the only one that can enable us to avoid being faced with an alternative that I call catastrophic: an Iranian bomb or the bombing of Iran”. Almost a year later, the problem of Iran’s nuclear programme remains unresolved, and with time running out, the prospect of confronting Sarkozy’s catastrophic alternative is becoming a distinctly realistic possibility. This report will offer a glimpse into what concretely constitutes this alternative in order to help policy makers contemplate the choices still available to avoid such a dangerous course.

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When it comes to Iran’s nuclear program, most U.S. and allied officials are in one or another state of denial. All insist it is critical to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet, few understand just how late it is to attempt this. Iran is now no more than 12 to 48 months from acquiring a nuclear bomb. It lacks for nothing technologically or materially to produce it, and it seems dead set on securing an option to do so. As for the most popular policy options – to bomb or bribe Iran – too few analysts and officials are willing to admit publicly how self-defeating these courses of action might be. As for sanctioning Iran, this may be desirable but will be difficult to implement without the support of all of the world’s major nations. They, in turn, are unlikely to be persuaded to follow the lead of the U.S. and its key allies unless they are convinced that the U.S. is willing and able with its friends to act in a meaningful way to limit Iran’s freedom of action.